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NOTES.
BILLS AND NOTES-VALUE-COLLATERAL SECURITY-The recent
case of Houston v. McCaslin 1 decides that taking a negotiable instru-
ment as collateral security for an antecedent debt constitutes the
taker a holder in due course in Pennsylvania. Before the Negotiable
Instruments Law, the Pennsylvania law was opposite.2 This case is
the first decision on the subject in the Superior or Supreme Court 3
since the Negotiable Instruments Law.
'65 Super. 28 (Pa. xq16).
'Gibson, J., in Petrie v. Clark, i S. & R. 377 (1824); Garrard v. R. R.,
29 Pa. 154 (1851) ; Carpenter v. Bank, io6 Pa. 170 (1884).
'A decision by Mr. Justice Von Moschzisker, now of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in Raken v. Henry, 16 D. R. 2o7 (Pa. I9O7), holds, after a
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Section 25 of the Negotiable Instruments Law reads, "Value is
any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antece-
dent debt constitutes value." 4 Section 27 is, "When the holder has
a lien on the instrument, he is deemed a holder for value to the
extent of the lien." Section 191, "'Holder' means the payee or
endorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer
thereof." These sections were intended to declare that taking paper
as collateral security constitutes value. John J. Crawford, Esq., the
draftsman of the Act, says, 5 "The holder who has taken the paper
as collateral security very plainly has a lien thereon, and is therefore
within the terms of section 53 (section 27)." In a lower court case
in New York, it was held that these sections did not change the law of
New York that collateral security was not value.8 While another
New York case 7 says, "The language (of section 25) ought to leave
no doubt on the subject" that the Act changes the law. In Missouri,8
North Carolina 9 and Michigan,'0 it has been held that sections 25
and 27 changed the common law of those states and that one taking
as collateral security for an antecedent debt was a holder for value.
There is no consideration "sufficient to support a simple con-
tract" in the case of collateral security. The holder, however, gener-
ally forbears to sue on the original debt until the due date of the
collateral paper and this performance might be regarded as a quid
pro quo, sufficient to bring him within section 25. If this argument
will not prevail, section 27 would seem to cover the case clearly.
The holder 11 of paper given as collateral has a personally created
lien, e. g., a pledge, just as the pawnee of chattels. Section 27 ex-
pressly declares then, that he is a holder to the amount of the lien.
The Pennsylvania case not only seems to follow the Act, but
also to represent the true policy from the viewpoint of commercial
expediency. "The creditor is thereby enabled to secure his debt,
and thus may safely give a prolonged credit, or forbear from taking
any legal steps to enforce his rights. The debtor has the advantage
of making his negotiable instruments equivalent to cash. The (oppo-
scholarly review of the Negotiable Instruments Law and the cases, that
collateral security is not value.
' Wisconsin, by Statute, Sec. i675-5r, by addenda to this section- declares
that collateral security is not value.
'3d Ed. Annotation on Negotiable Instruments Law.
Sutherland v. Mead, 8o N. Y. S. 5o4 (i9o3).
Brewster v. Schrader, 57 N. Y. S. 6o6 (1899).
Bank v. Morris, 156 Mo. App. 43 (I91i).
'Brooks v. Sullivan, 129 N. C. x9o (I9OI).
"Graham v. Smith, i55 Mich. I65 (19o8).
Section 27 merely requires that the "holder" have a lien, not a holder in
due course; i. e., the holder need not have given value within section 25, but
need be only "the payee or endorsee, of a bill or note, or the bearer thereof."
Section 1)i.
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site) doctrine would strike a fatal blow to all discounts of negotiable
instruments. It is for the benefit of the commercial world to give
as wide an extension as possible to commercial paper." 12
T.K.F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMPULSORY WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION-In three decisions recently handed down, the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the constitutionality of Workmen's Com-
pensation as applied in several of the states.' In the Hawkins case
the act extends to all employments with slight exceptions, and to
injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment. The
statute is elective in form, but compulsory in effect, as any employer
who rejects its provisions is deprived of his common-law defenses,
and has the onus of establishing his exercise of due care. In the
White case the New York law covers forty-two groups of "hazard-
ous employments," the liability being in general without regard to
fault and exclusive of other remedies. The employer may secure
compensation by insurance either in a state fund, in a specially au-
thorized insurance company, or by self-insurance in proper cases.
The Washington statute covers enumerated industries characterized
as "extra-hazardous" (which, however, include practically all the
industrial activity of the state), and all injuries "incurred upon the
premises or at the plant, or, he being in the course of his employ-
ment, away from the plant of his employer." The salient and distin-
guishing feature of the Washington Act is that the source of com-
pensation is derived solely from a state fund maintained by com-
pulsory contributions from employers, the amount of premiums paid
by each employer being determined by the hazard of the particular
industry in which he may be engaged.
To the objection that under these acts an efnployer is subjected
to liability without fault on his part, the court, in its opinion, points
out numerous instances in which recovery has been allowed without
regard to fault or negligence. It is further noted that negligence is
merely the disregard of some duty imposed by law, and the nature
and extent of the duty may be modified by legislation with corre-
sponding change in the test of negligence, or without negligence
other than a failure to comply with a statutory duty. 2 The common-
law doctrines of assumption of risk, of contributory negligence . .
are stated to be mere fictions of the common law, and, as such, not
beyond alteration by legislation in the public interest. Great empha-
sis is placed upon the fact that all common-law rules respecting the
" Story, J., in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. I (U. S. 1842).
'New York Central R. R. v. White, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247 (1917) ; Hawkins
v. Bleakly, 37 Sup. Ct Rep. 255 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26o (1917).
2 New York Central R. R. v. White, supra, p. 251.
NOTES
liability of employer and employee are not violently set aside, but
that another, and a reasonably just substitute, is provided. Indeed,
a doubt is suggested as to the authority of the state to abolish all
rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without
setting up something adequate in their stead.
In considering whether the acts are arbitrary or unreasonable
the court is led to place the principle of compensation upon some
ground of natural justice, and the economic theory advanced is, that
losses arising in the course of employment are part of the cost of
production, and should be charged up to the employer in the same
manner as the cost of repairing broken machinery. The pecuniary
loss, it is also declared, should fall upon the employer because it
results from something done in the course of an operation from
which he expects to derive a profit, with the added thought that the
modified assumption of risk by the employee and the fixed responsi-
bility of the employer will be reflected in the wage scale.
It must be confessed, however, that it is difficult at times to
grasp the exact legal-economic doctrine upon which the system of
Workmen's Compensation is rested. At one point the court seems
to consider the relation of employer and employee as a mutual enter-
prise, but, it would seem, an enterprise out of which the employer
alone expects to obtain a profit.3 In addition to this community of
interest between the employer and employee, the paramount concern
of the state in the relation is emphasized. The theory that the status
of employer is a franchise, and that conditions precedent thereto
may be imposed by the state, is not advanced.4 But it is unequiv-
" "The pecuniary loss resulting from the employee's death or disablement
must fall somewhere. It results from something done in the course of an
operation from which the employer expects to derive a profit. In excluding
the question of fault as a cause of the injury, the act in effect disregards the
proximate cause and looks to the one more remote, the primary cause as it
may be deemed, and that is, the employment itself. For this both parties are
responsible, since they voluntarily engage in it as coadventurers, with personal
injury to the employee as a probable and foreseen result. In ignoring any
possible negligence of the employee producing or contributing to the injury,
the lawmaker reasonably may have been influenced by the belief that in modern
industry the utmost diligence in the employer's is in some degree inconsistent
with adequate care on the part of the employee for his own safety; that the
more intently he devotes himself to the work the less he can take precautions
for his own security. And it is evident that the consequences of a disabling or
fatal injury are precisely the same to' the parties immediately affected and to
the community, whether the proximate cause be culpable or innocent. Viewing
the entire matter, it cannot be pronounced arbitrary and unreasonable for the
state to impose upon the employer the absolute duty of making a moderate and
definite compensation in money to every disabled employee, or in case of his
death, to those entitled to look to him for support, in lieu of the common-law
liability confined to cases of negligence." New York Central R. R. v. White,
suPra, p. 253.
'Cf. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 113 (91o).
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ocally stated that such statutes have a direct relation to the protection
of the lives and health of a large and important element in the com-
munity, and are a reasonable exercise of the police power.5
In upholding the Washington statute and the method therein
adopted of creating the compensation fund solely by premiums based
upon the risk of the particular industry, the decision constitutes a
definite advance upon the previous cases. This feature of the act
is somewhat unusual; moreover, it is difficult to perceive precisely
what public purpose is subserved by computing the rate of insurance
with reference to the risk of each industry. It has been urged against
the compensation scheme that under it the carefully managed plants
will be required to make good the losses arising through the negli-
gence of their competitors. Under the Washington Act exactly this
result would seem to be produced: The majority of the court meets
this contention by pointing out that: "Taking the fact that accidental
injuries are inevitable, in connection with the impossibility of fore-
seeing when, or in what particular plant or industry they will occur,
. . . the state may impose the entire burden on the industries that
occasion the losses, irrespective of the particular plant in which the
accident may happen to occur." 6 This fatalistic conception which
views industrial accidents as inevitable, colors the opinion of the
court in each of the decided cases. It is submitted, however, that
while industrial accidents are inevitable, their relative frequency
varies not only with the industry, but also with the precautions and
safeguards adopted by a particular plant. With precisely this in
view many of the acts permit a form of self-insurance by which the
employer is stimulated to the utmost degree of care, and the adoption
of the best form of safety devices. It is true that the provisions of
the Washington Act will place upon the employer the indirect pres-
sure of his competitors, and probably will be supplemented by other
acts requiring the adoption of safety appliances.
This feature of the act is upheld by reference to Noble State
Bank v. Haskell,7 the court declaring that: "The idea of special
excise taxes for regulation and revenue apportioned to the special
injury attributable to the activities taxed is not novel." In that case,
and in the numerous cases cited in support of this principle, several
additional elements were present which would seem to have justified
the mode adopted of apportioning the burden. In a typical case
where a tax is laid on dogs to compensate sheep owners for injuries
to sheep inflicted by dogs, there is an initial difficulty in tracing the
source of the damage sustained. In such cases it is the expense and
difficulty, or even the impossibility, of affirming the liability that
5 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1884) ; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133
(1893) ; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1897) ; Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U. S. I (IgII).
* Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, supra, p. 267.
T219 U. S. 104 (1910).
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justifies the sweeping provisions of the act. In the Bank case this
takes the form of a mutual interdependence by which the most care-
ful bank is, to a not inconsiderable extent, at the mercy. of the most
reckless. In addition, the broad and rigid control which the state
exercised over the banks brought them all within a certain minimum
degree of careful and efficient management. The insurance sought
to be secured was not against the inevitable and easily computed
hazards of careful management, but against the uncertain disasters
of speculative and illegal banking. The uniformity of the assess-
ment was justified by the uniformity (due to the uncertainty) of the
risk. In the practical administration of Workmen's Compensation,
no such mutual interdependence is apparent; the frequency of acci-
dents in any particular establishment, especially in the larger plants,
cannot be termed uncertain.
Worthy of note is the very little stress placed by the court upon
the degree of hazard required to place an industry within the scope
of the compensation acts. By the Washington Act almost every
industry is classified as hazardous. To the objection raised against
such classification, it is answered: "The question of whether any of
the industries enumerated is non-hazardous will be proved by experi-
ence,8 and the provisions of the act form sufficient assurance that if
in any industry there be no accident, there will be no assessment
unless for expenses of administration." If the foregoing is intended
to imply that every industry in which an accident occurs may be
classified as hazardous, and such appears to be the import of the
words used, the court would seem to have been guilty of a non-
sequitur. The court, indeed, may have intimated that so far as the
burden of its three opinions was concerned, an employee had an
equal right to compensation whether his calling be hazardous or non-
hazardous. In either case the effect upon the person injured, his
family and dependents and upon the community would seem to be
identical. The reasoning which would rest the right of the state to
prescribe a system of compensation upon the inevitability of numer-
ous accidents and would limit the police power to cover industries
only where accidents are frequent, it is submitted, is narrowly legal,
and in no sense economic.
Of great significance is the absence of comment upon those
features of the acts which restrict the right of recovery to accidents
in the course of the employment. If Workmen's Compensation is
considered part of the cost of production, the scope of such acts must
be limited to injuries arising out of the industry. The somewhat
broader provisions of the Washington Act, though scarcely noted by
the court, should not be over-emphasized, in view of the frequent re-
currence in the opinions of the phrase "loss arising out of the busi-
ness," and equivalent expressions. However, it may be noted that the
'Past experience does not seem to be considered.
686 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
court does not seem to consider the more extended provisions of the
Washington Act a sufficient departure from the New York Act to
animadvert thereonY The status of an act which would award com-
pensation irrespective of the source of the injury must therefore be
deemed uncertain. Certainly a statute which covers every injury
sustained on the plant of the employer is beyond the scope of Work-
men's Compensation in its narrow sense. With the constitutionality
of these statutes now definitely established, a broader application of
the underlying principles would seem to be indicated in the direction
of accident insurance. Certainly their practical administration will
necessitate also a more stringent control by the state, over each indus-
trial plant.
B.W.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -'POLICE
POWERS-PROHIBITION OF BILLBOARDS IN RESIDENTIAI DISTRICTS-
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States has
determined that it is within the police power of a municipality to
regulate the size, material, manner of construction and the place of
erection of billboards as a special class of structure; and that such
regulation does not deprive any person of his liberty or property
without due process of law, or of the equal protection of the law,-
at least so far as the Constitution is concerned." In that case an
ordinance of the city of Chicago made it unlawful to erect any bill-
board or signboard in any block on any public street in which one-
half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively
for residence purposes, without first obtaining the written consent
of the owners of a majority of the frontage of the property on both
sides of the street; and the Supreme Court held that such an ordi-
nance was justifiable as a reasonable exercise of the police power of
the municipality, and, as such, did not conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the course of its opinion, the court points out that
refuse of all descriptions frequently collects around and behind such
structures, so that they become a menace to health; while they also
jeopardize the safety and morality of the community by facilitating
the start and spread of fires, and by affording a convenient conceal-
ment and shield for immoral practices, and for loiterers and crim-
inals. For these reasons, say the court, billboards are'to be consid-
ered as a class by themselves, as distinguished from buildings and
fences. Thus the court justifies at least a partial prohibition of the
erection, upon private property, of billboards, as such, without regard
to their manner of construction.
'This particular feature of the act was not emphasized by counsel for the
Mountain Timber Company.
'Cusack v. Chicago, 37 Sup. Ct. 190 (1917).
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Al examination of the decisions of the various state courts upon
this question, indicates that this is a rather extreme position. Most
of the state constitutions contain provisions similar to those of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the state courts generally have not been
so liberal as the Supreme Court in the application of those pro-
visions in cases relating to the regulation of billboards. One of the
first decisions by a state court upon this question, and one which
has been cited frequently since, is the case of Crawford v. Topeka.'
In that case the court held that a municipality might regulate the
erection of billboards upon private property so as to fully protect
persons passing along the street; but that an ordinance providing
that no person shall erect any billboard unless it is placed at such a
distance from the sidewalk as shall exceed, by at least five feet. the
height of such billboard, is an unreasonable regulation, not neces-
sary for the safety of the public, and is therefore invalid as an exer-
cise of the police power. This case refuses to recognize that there
is any sound reason for discriminating between billboards, if prop-
erly and securely erected, and other structures, such as buildings and
fences. Following the reasoning of this case, there have been a
number of subsequent decisions by state courts which have held that
the regulation of the size, location or material of billboards, as such,
without including similar structures used for different purposes, is
an unjust discrimination and is therefore illegal.3 The same deci-
sions also hold such regulation of billboards, without regard to
whether they may be a menace to the public health, safety, or morals,
is illegal, because it is not a valid exercise of the police power. Thus,
in the case of Bill Posting Co. v. Newburgh,4 an ordinance requiring
all billboards in the city to be constructed of metal is declared invalid
as an unreasonable exercise of the police power, in that many wooden
billboards might be erected at such places that they could not pos-
sibly spread fire. But later, in the same jurisdiction, a municipality
was permitted to prescribe definite fire limits within which the erec-
'tion of wooden structures, particularly billboards, was prohibited; '
and restrictions as to the height and solid space of skysigns were
also allowed as a reasonable exercise of the police power.6
All of the decisions recognize the right of a municipality, as
part of its police power, to regulate the erection of billboards in so
far as reasonably necessary for the protection of the health, safety
or morals of the public; but the courts have differed in their concep-
'51 Kan. 756 (1893).
'Curran Co. v. Denver, 47 Col. 221 (191o) ; Chicago v. Gunning System, 214
Ill. 628 (i9o5) ; Bill Posting Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N. J. L. 72 (1904) ; Passaic
v. Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J. L. 285 (19o5); State v. Whitlock, 149 N. C. 542
(19o8).
4 137 N. Y. Sup. 186 (1912) ; affirmed 138 N. Y. Sup. I144 (1913).
'People v. Miller, 161 N. Y. App. 138 (1914).
'People v. Ludwig, 158 N. Y. Supp. 2o8 (1916).
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tion as to what is a reasonably necessary regulation. In the case of
In re Wiltshire,' the court decided that an ordinance, limiting the
height of billboards on the ground to six feet was a reasonable regu-
lation, though admittedly a close case. The court declared that it
would take judicial notice of the fact that billboards are usually, if
not invariably, cheap and flimsy affairs constructed of wood, and
justified its decision on this ground- But this position was severely
criticised in Curran Co. v. Denver 8 as "opposed to all the authorities,
and erroneous in its logic and conclusions." All of the cases agree,
however, that an ordinance providing that no billboard over a certain
height should be erected without the consent of the common council,
or of some administrative officer, is a valid exercise of the police
power, because it is not an absolute prohibition of all billboards, but
permits a discrimination based upoh considerations of public safety."
But mere aesthetic or artistic considerations will never justify an
exercise of the police power; and therefore it is universally held that
an ordinance prohibiting the erection, on private property, of all
billboards merely because they are unsightly or incongruous, or for
any other reason, is invalid as an unreasonable exercise of the police
power.Y0 Similarly, the prohibition of the erection, on private prop-
erty, of any sign or billboard which may be seen from a public park,
is invalid as a restriction not prompted by any consideration of public
health, safety or morals." It has also been decided that an ordinance
of a municipality in "dry" territory, prohibiting the display of liquor
advertisements, was unreasonable, and therefore invalid,12 although
it would seem that if a community may prohibit the sale of liquor as
a reasonable police regulation, it should also be able, under its police
power, to prohibit advertisements designed to promote the sale of
liquor.
Although a majority of the state courts have condemned ordi-
nances whose regulatory provisions apply only to billboards or sim-
ilar structures used for advertising purposes, a few jurisdictions
have permitted such a classification; and in view of the recent
Supreme Court decision, the latter would seem to be the better view.
The theory upon which these cases proceed is that billboards and
similar structures erected for the purpose of displaying advertise-
ments are inherently different from a fence or a building. Gener-
ally, they are insecurely constructed and present a large surface to
1 O3 Fed. 62o (1900).
347 Col. 221 (191o).
' Whitmier v. Buffalo, 118 Fed. 773 (i9o2) ; Rochester v. West, 164 N. Y.
g1o (igoo); Gunning System v. Buffalo, 75 N. Y. App. 31 (1902).
"'Varney v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318 (19o9); Bryan v. Chester, 212 Pa. St.
259 (1905).
I Hailer Sign -Works v. Training School, 249 IIl. 436 (1911); Common-
wealth v. Boston Adv. Co., 188 Mass. 348 (1905).
' Haskell v. Howard, 269 Ili. 55o (1915).
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the wind; and, unlike a building, they possess no supporting walls,
so that they are extremely susceptible to collapse. If located on the
ground, access behind them is open, and they afford an excellent
concealment for the commission of all forms of nuisances and im-
moral practices; and great quantities of rubbish and trash usually
collect behind them, whereas a fence is designed to keep out in-
truders, and to prevent the other conditions to which billboards are
so conducive. The leading case in support of this view in the state
courts is St. Louis Gunning Cc. v. St. Louis,13 in which'the regula-
tion of the erection of billboards, as a distinct type of structure, is
justified upon considerations of the health, safety and morals of the
community; and this decision has been followed in at least four
other jurisdictions. 4 The more recent decisions in all the jurisdic-
tions seem to indicate that the growing complexity of our urban life
is inclining the courts to allow greater liberality to municipalities in
the application of their police power, so that in the future we may
expect the courts to approve, not only more minute police regula-
tions of billboards, but also the regulation of other subjects which
have previously escaped the attention of legislators and laws.
E.L.H.
CONSULS-LMITATIONS ON POWER TO DEAL WITH PROPERTY
RIGHTS OF THEIR NATIONALS-A consul is the commercial agent
of a country residing in a foreign community, usually a seaport,
whose duty it is to support the commercial intercourse of the state
and especially of the individual citizens.- He is not entitled to rep-
resent his sovereign in a country where the sovereign has an ambas-
sador, but "he has an undoubted right to interpose claims for the
restitution of property belonging to the subjects of his own coun-
try." 2 The various officials of this service, consuls general, consular
agents, etc., are invested with the same powers and duties, and,
though nominally different, the office of each is substantially the
same as that of the other and the name is determined by the relative
importance of the city or community to which the officer is assigned.-'
Limitations on the powers exercised by a consul are imposed by the
regulations of his own government and of that to which he is sent,
3235 Mo. 99 (19ii).
' Kansas City Gunning Co. v. Kansas City, i44 S. W. io99 (Mo. 1912);
State v. Staples, 73 S. E. 112 (N. C. I9I) ; Horton v. Old Colony Co., 36 R. I.
507 (1914) ; 7x parte Savage, 141 S. W. 244 (Tex. I91i).
13 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 764.
'Story, J., in Tie Anne, 3 Wheaton 435 (1818) ; see also Robson v. The
Huntress, 2 Wall. Jr. 59 (1851), and Gernon v. Cochran, Fed. Cas. No. 5368
(1804).
Schunior v. Russell, 83 Texas 83 (1892).
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by treaty or by the operation of the municipal law of that country.
Such sovereign state has the imprescriptible right in the absence of
treaty stipulation to forbid intervention in certain matters, even
though normally allowed to a consul.
The duties of a consul touching upon the property interests of
his nationals usually involve maritime matters or the administration
of estates. While the right of a consul to intervene on behalf of
citizens of his country who are absent but interested seems too well
established in practice to be doubted, still there are frequent occasions
when his duties are closely circumscribed. He may assert a claim
for his fellow-citizens even where the claimants are unknown with-
out any special authority, but he must have that before he can obtain
actual restitution or proceeds.4 This was several times decided dur-
ing our early history, when prizes were brought to our ports by
privateers. So a Spanish consul was allowed only to file a libel in
our courts for a vessel of his country seized by citizens of a Spanish
colony at war with Spain,5 and another consul could assert a claim
for slaves wrongfully captured by a privateer, but could not have
them surrendered without satisfactory proof as to the real owner.8
By the law of nations a consular officer is the provisional con-
servator of the property within his consular district belonging to his
countrymen who die therein. But the power and duty of a consul
so to guard, collect and transmit the decedent's estate is not exclu-
sive. Unless he is so authorized by treaty, local law or usage, he can
only assist others upon whom those functions devolve under local
law." A treaty with Germany authorizing German consuls to act as
the legal representatives of the Kaiser's subjects has been held not to
constitute such consuls administrators of deceased persons, nor to
authorize a consul to recover wages due a deceased seaman who was
in life a German subject, unless he represents heirs who are entitled
to the money and who are German subjects.8 On the other hand, a
very similar treaty with the Argentine Republic applying to Italy
under the "most favored nation" clause was interpreted to entitle
Italian consuls to administer the property of all nationals dying intes-
tate within their consular jurisdiction and after administration to
send the surplus to the next of kin in Italy.9 After administration
a foreign consul in the United States can receive the distributive
shares to which persons residing in his country are entitled from the
estate of one dying here.10 But "neither under the -law of nations
' The Bello Corruves, 6 Wheaton 152 (1821).
5 The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheaton 52 (i819).
'The Antelope, Io Wheaton 66 (1825).
T 7 Op. Atty. Genl. 274. Opinion of Attorney-General Cushing.
' The General McPherson, ioo Fed. 86o (Wash. igoo).
"In re Lobrasciano's Estate, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1O4O (1902).
"In re Tartaglio's Estate, 33 N. Y. Supp. 1121 (1895).
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nor the law of the United States nor any treaty with the King of
Sweden and Norway" could a consul of the latter take from an
administrator the succession of a Swede opened up in one of our
states, such a right being incompatible with th sovereignty of the
state.1 The various treaties made by our government really go no
farther than to make foreign consuls eligible to administer the estates
of their fellow-citizens when no one having a prior right under the
local laws is competent or willing to act, and are not intended to
supersede local laws and confer a right of administration upon
foreign consuls that is exclusive and paramount to all others.'
Recently a New York court held that the general law of nations
did not sustain as valid the settlement.by a Russian consul general
with a railroad for its negligent killing within his jurisdiction of a
countryman of the consul. Such a power was held not to be included
in the right to represent the "next of kin" in legal and other pro-
ceedings for the proper administration, conserving, and guarding
of the estates of his countrymen.' 3 The court relied on the proposi-
tion that the rights of consuls rest on international law as well as
treaty stipulation and it decided that the consul's act in accepting a
small sum for the wife and children of the deceased was not a release
of the railroad from further liability. Thus is illustrated the posi-
tion once taken by our State Department in refusing to extend to
Italian consuls certain rights as administrators; it was declared that
in view of the fact that the administration of estates in our country
was under the control of the respective states, it was thought that
such an international agreement should not be made.' 4  It would
seem, however, that this reason has ceased to be controlling; it is
certain that it should not be if we are to reciprocate with foreign
countries in extending powers to consuls. Half a century ago it
was declared that our consuls were authorized and required to act
as administrators on the estates of all United States citizens dying
intestate in foreign countries and leaving no legal representatives or
partner in trade.'0 Included in this, "one of the most sacred and
responsible trusts imposed by their office," is the duty to send the
proceeds of the administrated estates to the United States Treasury
to be held in trust for the legal representatives. 6
"Succession of Thompson, 9 La. Ann. 96 (1854).
'Matter of D'Adamo, 212 N. Y. 214 (1914).
"2Hamilton v. Erie R. R. Co., 114 N. E. 399 (N. Y.).
"For. Rel. (1894), 366; 196 MS. Dom. Let. 658.
Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, to Mr. Aspinwall, Aug. 21, i855, 44 MS.
Dom. Let. 270.
' Mr. Cadwalader, Assistant Secretary of State, to Mrs. Hopkins, March
27, 1876, 112 MS. Dom. Let. 456.
692 UNIVERSITY DF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The limitations on the power of consuls to deal with the prop-
erty rights of their nationals vary with the treaties binding the
various countries they represent and with the local laws of those to
which they are accredited. International law and usage have o1
course their influence in determining such limitations as are imposed
by diplomatic agreements and judicial decisions.
H.D.S.
CORPORATIONS-PowER OF DIRECTORS-REFUSAL TO REGISTER
TRANSFER OF SHARES OF STOcK-The desirability that those in
control of a corporation should retain that power has led to many
attempted restrictions on the free transfer of stock. This continued
shaping of policies by one group, while it may lead to efficient man-
agement, may be detrimental to the interests of minority stockhold-
ers. There is a further objection to conditions limiting the abso-
lute right to transfer stock, viz., that it is a restriction on a man's
otherwise absolute right to dispose of his personal property as he
pleases.
In the absence of restrictions in the articles of association,
directors cannot prevent the transfer of shares under the English
Companies Act of 1862, which provides that the company may deter-
mine the manner of transferring shares., Such restrictions are quite
common in the articles of English companies, however, and in a
recent English case 2 some interesting questions as to the discretion
of directors in refusing to register shares to transferees were pre-
sented. There a company was formed as an outgrowth of a firm of
steamship managers. The following provision was to be found in
the articles of association: "The directors and managers may decline
to register the transfer of any fully paid-up share or shares on cer-
tifying that, in their opinion, it is contrary to the interests of the
company that the proposed transferee should be a member thereof."
Dissension grew up between one of the directors and two others and
he threatened to wind up the company; he then made two transfers
of single shares, stating that his purpose was to fill a vacancy caused
by one woman, and to stop "hole-in-corner" meetings. The opposing
directors refused to register stock to the transferees, mentioning that
it was contrary to the company's interest that the transferee should
be a member thereof, but that the certificate did not reflect on
the personal character or financial standing of the transferee. The
directors deemed the transfer of single shares a departure from the
essential family nature of the company, as well as tending to increase
secretarial expenses. The court held that the directors had exceeded
'Weston's Case, L. R. 4 Ch. 20 (Eng. 1868).
2Re Bede Steam Shipping Co., 115 T. L. R. 580 (Eng. 1916).
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their discretion in declining to approve the transfer, because they
did favor splitting up the holding, they having no personal objection
to the proposed transferee. A dissenting judge held their act justi-
fied, intimating that the transferees were mere tools" of the trans-
feror, and that the directors had to consider whether the trans-
ferees were acting for some other person and whether the object of
that other person was contrary to the interests of the company.
We are, therefore, not surprised to find a leading New York
case holding that where no discretionary power was expressly re-
served, the directors of the Standard Oil Trust were obliged to
receive as a shareholder a competitor who had been a bitter enemy
of their concern, he having bought the shares in the open market.3
A by-law, unwarranted by a chatter prohibition of the transfer of
stock to competitors, was in accordance with this view held void.4
Many courts have held that a by-law, unauthorized by the charter,
restricting the transfer of shares of stock without first giving other
stockholders and the corporation an option to purchase it at a price
named, is void as being a restraint upon the alienation of property; '
so, of a by-law requiring the consent of the president and majority
of directors as a condition precedent to the transfer of shares.'
By-laws preventing transfer of stock to non-stockholders without
the consent of directors were held void as unreasonably restraining
transfer of property, and so the cases might be multiplied indefi-
nitely.7  But temporarily excluding stock from market during the
existence of a contract for the sale of treasury stock did not come
within the rule.8 It is to be noted that these cases are those in which
the charter makes no provision for restrictions on the sale of stock,
and, as in England, where charter contains such a clause, it is of
course valid.9 In a comparatively recent New Jersey decision there
was a section of the general corporation statutes that shares were
transferable on the books in such manner and under such regula-
tions as thei by-laws prescribed. A by-law provided for issuance of
a new certificate to the transferee if approved by the board of
directors. The act and by-law were construed as only authorizing
the directors to pass upon the formalities of transfer and not to
give them the right to refuse, in their discretion, a transfer by one
stockholder to another. The court, however, set its face against all
3 Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y. Appeals 174 (I89g2).
'Kretzer v. Lightning Rod Co., I81 S. W. lo66 (Mo. I916).
5 Bloede v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129 (1896); Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 21
R. 1. 9 (1898).
'Finch v. Macoupin Co., 146 Ill. App. 158 (19O9).
'Miller v. Farmers' Milling Co., 78 Neb. 441 (igo) ; Douglas v. Aurora
Daily News Co., i6o Ill. App. 5o6 (Igi1).
' Cook v. Buck, r49 Pac. 95 (Col. 1915).
'Casper v. Kalt Zimmers Co.. 159 Wis. 517 (1914).
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such fetters on the free transfer of stock.'0 In Wisconsin an early
decision 11 held a by-law prohibiting transfer of stock by a stock-
holder without consent of all the stockholders void as against public
policy. In a later case,12 however, in the same jurisdiction, articles
of incorporation, by-laws and stock certificates on their face, pro-
vided that shares were not transferable except in pursuance of a
vote of two-thirds of outstanding shares and this majority might
either consent to the transfer or themselves take up the shares sought
to be transferred by paying for them at par. If they did neither
the holder was at liberty to sell and transfer his shares as usual.
The court said, "It is sometimes necessary and often desirable that
a corporation protect itself against the acquisition of shares of its
stock by rivals in business or other disturbers who might purchase
shares merely for the purpose of acquiring information which might
thereafter be used against the interests of the company." Similar
restrictions upon the transfer of shares are generally recognized
and held valid where they form part of the charter or articles of
organization of the corporation and are matters of contract. So we
find the Massachusetts courts starting a chain of authorities holding
that even though a by-law to the effect that a board of directors
should appraise the value of shares and have the option to take
them at that value in case of any transfer should be void, it would
be upheld as an agreement between corporation and stockholder, the
by-law in question being printed on back of the certificates."3 As a
further step in the development of the doctrine in that jurisdiction
comes the decision holding that in the absence of proof of West
Virginia law a by-law of a corporation of that state prohibiting a
stockholder from selling stock without first offering for sale to
directors, the court saying, "There seems to be no greater objection
to retaining the right of choosing one's associates in a corporation
than in a firm." 14 An Ohio court construed a general provision in
the corporation statutes of Delaware authorizing a corporation to
make by-laws for the certification of a transfer of stock as render-
ing valid a by-law giving directors thirty days within which to
dispose of stock to persons deemed desirable as holders.'
In accordance with the view of the Abbott case, Pennsylvania
holds when the organizers of a corporation agreed that a by-law of
the proposed corporation should provide that the subscriber should
not sell his stock until he should have offered it to other stock-
"0 Morris v. Dyeing Machine Co., 81 N. J. E. 256 (1913).
'lin Re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401 (1886).
'Farmers' Co. v. Laun, 146 Wis. 252 (191I).
"New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148 (1894); Weiland v.
Hogan, 172 Mich. 626 (1913).
14 Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476 (19o2).
"Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94 (1912).
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holders, such a by-law is upheld as an agreement among subscribing
stockholders."' A similar restriction in the by-laws was sustained in
Feldstein's estate,' 7 the restriction being noted on the certificate.
Thus we see from a survey of the cases that the courts are
tending away from the view that there is something pernicious in
provisions adopted at organization of the corporation, giving those
vitally interested in the corporation a chance to buy up shares before
they are placed upon the market, or even in reposing, as in the
English case, discretion in the directors as to registering the trans-
feree. It is submitted that the discretion of the directors exercising
this power is as much a subject of review as a case where they had
set aside a sum for depreciation to the apparent detriment of rights
of preferred stockholders to a dividend, and that such a control is
essential to the maintenance of a family concern, whici, as in our
principal case, is really a partnership under corporate guise.
C. B. W.
"Garrett v. Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 78 (i909).
"25 D. R. 602 (Pa. ii6).
